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1.  Introduction
In a public consultation paper, the European Union (EU) asks its citizens and 
Member States to come up with ideas how to reform the EU Budget. The key 
research challenge of our paper – to answer the consultation paper – is to give a 
novel angle from the point of fiscal sociology and Austrian economics towards 
the selection among the alternative budgetary powers made available to the EU.
We do suggest guidelines for exclusion and inclusion of provisions in the EU-
Budget that are not prizes captured in negotiations, often partisan struggles, 
between the Member States. The focus is on the normative evaluation of quasi-
permanent budgetary institutions and their tasks. We do also suggest that such a 
constitutional framework creates trust and facilitates a robust democratic debate. 
The emphasis is not, as is usually the case based on a benevolent EU, to enhance 
economic efficiency (making the EU “work better”) and / or to increase the equity 
of budget rules. We will put to test a different approach: an analysis that we define 
by the limits it places on the powers of Brussels, an egoistic despot, to “tax and 
spend”. Though the model of a budget-maximizing Leviathan-like EU bureau-
cracy, a discretionary agency, may seem extreme, the norms laid down may pos-
sible prove acceptable as embodying a minimax strategy: to ensure that the best 
remains a possibility by guarding against the worst.
2.  Background And Approach To The Problem
Since the rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty in 2005 by French and Dutch 
voters, a revision of the budgetary powers of the EU is a priority. If, the “no” 
of the French and Dutch citizens was a revolution, the truth counts that at least 
halve of all historic revolutions were fiscal revolutions1. Hence the 2007 consul-
tation call by the Commission is, in the words of Dalia Grybauskaite (European 
Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget), a “unique, may be once-
in-a-lifetime opportunity”, to discuss a fundamental review of the EU Budget2. 
1 Nef, R., Lob des Non-Zentralismus, Sankt Augustin: Aca-demia Verlag, (2002).
2 European Commission: Communication from the Commission. Reforming the Budget, 
Changing Europe. A public Consultation Paper in view of the 2008/2009 budget re-view, 
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In 2011 the Commission will come up with a final reform proposal for the next 
Financial Framework (2014 and onwards). In the mean time the Commission asks 
Europeans and the Member States for their completely “open and no taboo” opin-
ion on the reform of the EU budget: a wide-ranging review of all aspects of EU 
spending and resources.
The road suggested in the Commission’s consultation paper, just as the 
approach after the rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty, can be a very toil-
some process inside the realm of partisan (Member States’) advocacy. Solidarity, 
for instance, has to be bought with financial pet projects for individual Member 
States. Or, alternatively, budget reform is discussed by the direct application of 
abstract ethical norms in a vacuous (without a model of governmental-political 
behavior) institutional setting.
Moreover, fiscal decision-making is often based on the rule that policies have 
to pose as little resistance as possible for the majority that must approve of them. 
The feeling, often, dominates that someone else pays3. In the four years before 
2005, no member of the US congress has on total voted for a reduction in govern-
ment outlays, though the rhetoric to speak of fiscal discipline was on the rise4. A 
situation, probably, that is not much different for Europe. Besides, in general, it is 
most likely that possible rates of government spending will always be higher than 
the revenue from the taxes legislatures are willing to impose on their constitu-
ents5. This since decisions on the spending side of the budget are made indepen-
dently of the decisions on the taxing side. Ever growing government tasks and a 
growing government budget and corresponding taxation are the result.
The paper shifts the grounds for the debate on the reform of the EU budget 
towards an authentic fundamental review: it focuses on the choices among quasi-
permanent constraints (within which alternatives should the EU’s budgetary 
powers be exercised) and not, as is usually the case6, on choices within given 
constraints. The paper adopts a rule-based perspective on the EU Budget: we do 
choose budgetary rules of which we know that such institutions, once selected, 
will remain in being over an indeterminately long sequence of budgetary periods. 
We should take literally Grybauskaite remark about an “once-in-a-lifetime possi-
Brussels, 12.9.2007, SEC (2007) 1188 final.
3 Spicer, M. W. On Friedrich Hayek and Taxation: Rationality, Rules, and Majority Rule. 
National Tax Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1, (1995).
4 Dircksen, J. Vote Tally Report 108-2. NTUF Policy Paper 156, (2005), www.ntu.org.
5 See Buchanan (1980, 2000).
6 ECB, The EU budget: How much scope for Institutional Reform? European Central Bank, 
Occasional Paper Series, no. 27, April (2005).
 ECFIN workshop, The role of fiscal rules and institutions in shaping budgetary outcomes: 
proceedings from the ECFIN workshop. Economic Papers, nr. 275, (2007).
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bility”. The rules are quasi-permanent and long-lived. Members States are unable 
to predict with precision what their position will be at any particular moment in 
the future. In particular, they are presumed to be unable to identify their posi-
tion (a veil of ignorance) either as payer or as spending beneficiary in a sequence 
of separate budgetary periods. History shows that these kinds of debate about a 
framework for political action, not an instrument thereof, have been possible and 
fruitful7.
Our research is a normative activity. It is not discussed in traditional con-
stitutional law, which mostly looks at existing positive law8. In public finance, 
however, the whole problem seems to have no place either. It is typical something 
that is often considered to be too vague; it is to be described as fiscal sociology9. 
Primarily, the method used to discuss constitutional limitations cannot be empiri-
cal. There is a clear difference between our empirical knowledge of decision-
making within a given framework and discussions about the framework itself. To 
discuss the latter is like speculation. In that realm, hypotheses are only conceptu-
ally refutable.
3.  Fiscal Sociology And Austrian Economics
The EU fiscal system has three segments. The first segment is the EU budget. 
The second one is the harmonization of the national tax systems. The third is 
the coordination of the budget policies of the Member States through EU’s fiscal 
rules, e. g., the Pact on Stability and Growth and the Maastricht convergence 
criteria. This paper concentrates on the first segment. Cultural, political (3.1), and 
economic (3.2) reasons make it difficult to have fiscal decision-making re the EU 
budget in the sense of an all-out democratic process on a broad spectrum of EU 
tasks.
7 Buchanan, J. M., Choice, Contract, and Constitutions. Indiana-polis: Liberty Fund, (2001).
 Elster, J. Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblée Constituante. 
Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, Working Paper no. 4, August, 
(1991).
8 Kinneging, A. De Europese Grondwet, het staatsrecht en de constitutionele theorie. In: Cli-
teur, P., Franken, H., Voermans, W., eds. Naar een Europese Grondwet, Den Haag: Boom, 
(2004), p. 130.
9 Backhaus, J. Fiscal Sociology: What for? American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Jan. 
(2002).
 Backhaus, J. Fiscal Sociology: Guest editor’s introduction. Journal of Economic Bahavior & 
Organization, Vol. 59 (2006).
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3.1  Political And Cultural Differences
Fiscal policy and democracy are hard to reconcile. It is an almost impossible 
combination to ask for. To understand and solve this problem we do need the 
approach of fiscal sociology: a fusion of economics and sociology. It is (a change 
of) socio-political rules we are looking at. How can social order be established 
and preserved? A fiscal constitution must accommodate not only Member States 
with different constitutions and different economic and political systems, but also 
with different histories, cultures and socio-political visions10. We can identify the 
burden of taxation as the focus of research in fiscal sociology. Fiscal sociology 
is a science that became necessary after the twentieth century separation of eco-
nomics, sociology, politics and law, with the resulting lacunae. Large comprehen-
sive studies, which once characterized the activities of leading social scientists, 
became de-emphasized.
In the middle of the previous century, Friedrich Hayek11 wrote that democracy 
can only under very restricted conditions be transposed to a supra-national orga-
nization. A little later, his American counter-ego Milton Friedman said the same. 
If you apply both ideas to the situation in Europe, we have to conclude that the 
EU is not only missing the necessary homogeneity to form clear policy goals in a 
democratic way, but it misses as well the stimuli not to waste money.
Why is it so hard to expect concrete policy goals and fiscal constraint from 
the European parliament – the most democratic institution of the EU? Of course, 
very general objectives (e. g., prosperity for everyone) will be easy to agree on. 
After that, however, it becomes difficult. Concrete objectives will be difficult 
to formulate. The countries of the EU differ too much in culture, history and 
economic development. Every choice supposes a balancing of the pros and cons 
(cp. Hayek12. The recently weakened Services Directive of 2006, e. g., is supposed 
to show the social face of the EU. No worker from Eastern Europe, however, will 
be glad with the “social protection” of the revised directive or the “social clause” 
in the new Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Within a relatively homogeneous country 
like the Netherlands, however, the original directive would be no problem. Every 
plumber from the north of the Netherlands is welcome in the south. Likewise, 
the Netherlands, e. g., is supporting with a low price of gas a national pride: the 
10 Backhaus, J. Fiscal Sociology: Guest editor’s introduction. Journal of Economic Bahavior & 
Organization, Vol. 59 (2006).
11 Hayek, F. A. Freedom and the Economic System, Public Policy Pamphlet, No. 29, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, (1939).
 Hayek, F. A. The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism. In: Individualism and Eco-
nomic Order, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, (1949), pp. 255-272.
12 See Hayek (1944), (1986), p. 168.
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agriculture of vegetables in greenhouses in the west of the country. However, the 
very same solidarity for a, e. g., Spanish national pride is something completely 
different. The same goes for the other way around.
Hence, if a parliament cannot give and agree on policy objectives, the Euro-
pean Commission remains de facto the administration. Often below the guise 
that it concerns only a technical affair. That is hard to maintain. Over a change 
in policy, no matter how technically it does look like, the parliament belongs to 
decide. Moreover, also the Commission has to do with the various wishes of the 
Member States that do make up the members of the Commission.
Besides that, large countries will never transfer their economic power to Brus-
sels. The course of events re the reformation of the Pact on Stability and Growth 
is characteristic thereof. It is naïve to expect the same reforms if a few small 
countries had broken the rules. Therefore, we can expect that, e. g., the new rule 
on decision-making by the way of a qualified majority, to be introduced in 2014, 
based on the double majority of Member States and people, 55 % of the Member 
States representing at least 65 % of the Union’s population, is violated if it should 
be of a disadvantage to large countries.
The EU, also, has hardly any incentives not to waste money. The best guar-
antee not to waste money is that the same person both owns and does spend the 
money13. For then we can expect that you loan on the penny and sees to it that you 
do get value for your money. Members of parliaments or commission members, 
however, do spend others men’s money, on behave of, often again, other men. 
That is almost a guarantee for ineffective and inefficient spending. Of members 
of a local parliament we can expect some restraint in spending the taxpayers’ 
money of their own citizens. What to think, however, of an Eastern-European 
member of the EU-parliament who does spend the money of West-European tax-
payers at projects in Eastern Europe? To satisfy the members of parliament of 
Western-European countries pork-barrel legislation will rise. Not much different 
as is presently the case in the US where the support of congressional representa-
tives has to be bought with financial presents (pet projects) for their local con-
stituents. In short, we will see more signs along the roads that state, “This project 
has been realized with the help of the EU”. A project, if the Member State had to 
decide and pay for itself, it would not have spent the money on.
In sum, cultural and political differences make it difficult to have a fiscal con-
stitution in the sense of an all-out democratic process in which majorities do 
decide. We can transpose democracy to a supra-national organization only under 
13 Friedman, M. and R. Free to Choose. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, [1979], (1981), p. 146.
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very restricted conditions14. It is, however, the popular thing to do15. The solidar-
ity and trust that is necessary for concrete policies within the EU is very tenuous. 
Even within one country if things do differ like language (Belgium), religion 
(North-Ireland) or economic development (North and South-Italy) solidarity is 
hard to find. All of these situations do characterize the situation within the Euro-
pean parliament. Policies, no matter how good the intentions behind them, which 
are possible for each of the countries separately, are no option for the EU as 
a whole. Europe lacks the necessary homogeneity; priorities cannot be set. To 
transfer authority and hence policy to Brussels has its limits. Hence, of an (in the 
future) democratically chosen Chinese parliament with its approximately 3000 
members we can expect more priority setting then by the 751 members of the 
European parliament. China with its fifty minorities but overwhelming majority 
of almost 95 per cent Han Chinese is more a unity then the 27 members of EU are.
3.2  Economic Differences
Why does the new Treaty of Lisbon (2007) set out individual freedom as one of 
the core values of the EU? It is a good in itself. We can only make real choices 
based on individual freedom. Freedom is also essential to develop as a moral 
being. Man is first and for all a spiritual being. The choices, e. g., we make to help 
other people, have to be taken in freedom.
Individual freedom is also a necessity for our economic order: the market 
economy. Not only, quite visible, the climate and the physical characteristics of 
the Member States do differ, but, less visible, though of more importance, also 
men in their preferences and knowledge do differ. A market economy, as has been 
emphasized by the Austrian-born economist Hayek, is to make optimal use of 
those differences in knowledge16. Hence, the problem in a market economy is not 
to give the central authorities, be it Brussels or a local government, all the extra 
knowledge it needs to pursue policy. The problem is to give each individual all the 
extra knowledge he needs, mostly in the form of price (profit) signals, so he can 
decide for himself how to pursue his own goals. In this way, society does make 
14 Gillingham, J. European Integration 1959-2003. Superstate or New Market Economy. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, (2003).
 Gillingham, J. Design for a New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2006).
15 Leonard, M. Democracy in Europe. How the EU can survive in an age of referendum. Essays 
Centre for European Reform, (March 2006).
 Verhofstadt, G. De Verenigde Staten van Europa, Manifest voor een nieuw Europa. Antwer-
pen: Houtekiet, (2005).
16 Hayek, F. A. Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, (1982), Volume 1.
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use of often-unique knowledge of local circumstances and preferences that do 
differ in time. Knowledge that is difficult to centralize. An idea as valid for indi-
viduals as for countries and has found its expression in the idea of subsidiarity17.
Hayek describes the market process as one of learning by discovery. We are 
looking at the core of Austrian economics. In Austrian economics knowledge 
dissemination and the discovery thereof are of central importance. Endogenous 
change in the ends-means relationship – says Israel Kirzner, building his theory 
as Hayek did – is possible with the entre preneurial element in each individual 
market participant: alertness. Alertness is “the propensity […] toward fresh goals 
and the discovery of hitherto unknown resources”18. A disequilibrium situation 
points to market ignorance. From it emerge profi table opportunities, alertness 
exploits. Alertness gives a more realistic image of human action (and hence real 
choice) and makes possible the description of the market as a unified discovery 
process. “[The] ‘alertness’ view of the entrepreneurial role rejects the thesis that 
if we attribute genuine novelty to the entrepreneur, we must necessarily treat 
entreprene urially generated market events as not related to earlier market events 
in any systematic way. The genuine novelty […] attribute[d] to the entrepreneur 
consists in his sponta neous discovery of the opportunities marked out by ear-
lier market conditions (or by future market conditions as they would be in the 
absence of his own actions)” […] “[These] entrepreneurial discoveries are the 
steps through which any possible tendency toward market equilib rium must 
proceed”19.
A market economy makes room for human freedom and uses existing knowl-
edge the best20. Hence we should make decisions re rules on an as decentralized 
level as possible. The economic way to solve problems when sovereignty sharing 
by the way of a complete harmonizing of all rules is impossible is to apply the 
concept of mutually recognition of differences21. In a market exchange, strong 
differences of opinion are taken care of in a peaceful way. Subsidiarity, an orga-
17 Backhaus, J. Das Subsidiäritatsprinzip als Baustein einer entstehender Europäischen Verfas-
sung. (2001).
18 Kirzner, I. M. Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago: University of Chicago, Press, 
(1973), p. 34.
19 Kirzner, I. M. Discovery and the Capitalist Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
(1985), pp. 11-12.
20 Hayek, F. A. Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Rout-ledge & Kegan Paul, (1982), 
Volume 1.
 Buchanan, J. M. Liberty, Market and State. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, (1986).
21 Backhaus, J. Das Subsidiäritatsprinzip als Baustein einer entstehender Europäischen Verfas-
sung, (2001), p. 9.
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nizing and enforceable principle is congruent with the market22. In a sense, com-
petition between local authorities or Member States, where there is freedom of 
movement, provides experimentation with alternative models that is conducive 
to growth. It resembles the market economy best23. Subsidiarity has remained a 
part of the new (reformed) European Treaty of Lisbon. It states that we should 
only shift powers to Brussels when Member States themselves cannot achieve 
the same results24. From this principle, which we can also describe as economic 
federalism25, flows the responsibility of the Member States to provide the legal 
conditions under which the citizens can accumulate wealth in order to satisfy 
their needs themselves.
In sum, in the last centuries the goal of a market economy in which everyone 
aims at his own interests and uses his own knowledge has been a basic economic 
value in Europe. For James Buchanan this is all a part of the superiority of the West-
ern value system26. In the 19e century John Stuart Mill already wrote, “it is now rec-
ognized, though not till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good 
quality of commodities are most effectively provided for by leaving the producers 
and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for 
supplying themselves elsewhere”27. John Maynard Keynes spoke in similar words a 
century later, “The advantage to efficiency of the decentralization of decisions and 
individual responsibility is even greater, perhaps, than the nineteenth century sup-
posed; and the reaction against the appeal to self-interest may have gone too far”28.
4.  Constititutional Political Economy
In constitutional economics, we define the rules of the socio-economic-politi-
cal game. We have to make two sorts of constitutional decisions. First, we must 
choose from possible constitutional (so-called higher law) rules. Behind a veil of 
ignorance, countries and people choose electoral and non-electoral constitutional 
22 Ibid.
 Apolte, T. Die eigentümliche Diskussion um Zentralisierung und Dezentralisierung in der 
Europapolitik. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 5(3), (2004), pp. 271-291.
23 Hayek, F. A. The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge, (1960), p. 230.
24 See: Treaty 2004, Title III, Article I-11, cp. Treaty, 2007.
25 Inman, R. P., Rubinfeld, R. P. Rethinking Federalism. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol. 11, No. 4. (Autumn, 1997).
26 Buchanan, J. M. Restoring the Spirit of Classical Liberalism. Notes from FEE, (July 2005), 
p. 1.
27 Mill, J. S. On Liberty. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, [1859], (1974), p. 164.
28 Keynes, J. M. The General Theory or Employment, Interest, and Money. New York: Harcourt, 
[1937], (1964).
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rules. No one knows his future position. (Of all the Member States, Germany 
broke the rules of Pact on Stability and Growth. Though beforehand, Germany 
was a most unlikely candidate.) It is at this initial constitutional decision stage, 
where we choose the basic fiscal arrangements, that citizens not only can really 
control the state, but widespread public agreement is possible29. This since the 
prospect for general agreement changes dramatically if we allow for some intro-
duction of ignorance and / or uncertainty into the Member States’ calculus. The 
prospects of agreement relate directly to the predicted length of life of the tax 
reform. Then we will tend to opt for rules that are “fair”. Hence the measures 
to be discussed below are meant not just for the upcoming, 2013, sixth financial 
framework but “forever”. Besides, it is always easier to secure agreement on a set 
of rules than to secure agreement for example on who is our favorite player. The 
tone of the discussions is theoretical and argumentative. Gains for all members 
are real.
Second, we have to state rules for day-to-day policies within the framework. 
Making decisions by majority ensures the workability of the political process. The 
tone of the discussions is one of weighting up interests and bargaining30. Ordi-
nary politics, post constitutional choice, tends to be conflictual. The reformed 
EU treaty, however, gives unanimous consent a smaller role, without making the 
distinction between the just-mentioned two sorts of decisions.
Part of the difficulty of our answer is constitutional illiteracy. We have to shore 
up constitutional understanding: the choice by individuals, who are related one to 
another in an anticipated set of interactions, of a reciprocally binding constraint31. 
Rules and institutions rather than outcomes should be the focus. In general, 
orthodox public finance, with its emphasis on the direct application of normative 
criteria to tax arrangements, does not give us an understanding of observed fiscal 
processes in the EU nor is it a basis for improvement on grounds that are accept-
able to the taxpayers. As we do test in this paper, the logic of a constitutional 
approach can give such an interpretation, just as it gave an analytic interpretation 
of the popular tax revolts sweeping across the U.S. in the late 1970s. A constitu-
tion contains a principle-based limitation of the role of government in society and 
defines the basic rules for ordinary politics. A constitution is a framework for 
political action, not an instrument for action32.
29 Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M. The Power to Tax, Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitu-
tion. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, (1980), (2000).
30 Elster, J. Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblée Constituante. 
Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe. Working Paper no. 4, (August, 
1991).
31 Rawls, J. A. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1971).
32 Elster, J. Ulysses Unbound. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, (2000), p. 100.
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There are no unique constitutional solutions; several combinations of electoral 
and non-electoral rules are possible. In this paper, we first look at the tasks the 
EU has to do, and second we look at the way fiscal policy is decided. If political 
and cultural differences do exist (3.1), and freedom of choice and free initiative 
of citizens is important (3.2), limiting constitutional rules do make sense. Which 
reform of the EU budget is necessary? We can look back and learn from history. 
We look at what did shape the American fiscal constitution33. If the problem is 
to carry over tasks to supranational authorities, as is the case in new Treaty of 
Lisbon, we do feel protected if these supranational authorities can act on two 
provisions. Firstly, and, for James Buchanan, most importantly, on provisions 
that lay out the (limited) range and scope of activities that are appropriately to be 
undertaken (4.1)34. Secondly, on provisions that state a bicameral fiscal (constitu-
tional) framework (4.2)35.
4.1  Limiting The Tasks Of The Eu
If the problem is how to establish a limited government, we can look at the con-
stitution of the U.S. In the U.S., two authorities are of interest: the authorities in 
each of the states and the federal government in Washington. Is that not too much 
government? Not if both authorities compete with each other in the sense that 
they each have their own branch of power. We can guard a branch if a constitu-
tion does support us. As has been said by James Madison, one of the founders 
of the American constitution, in the U.S. constitution the central authorities do 
have little and limited and the states do have many and large competences36. The 
former has powers related to foreign policy and national defense. The latter has 
powers related to the criminal justice system and the protection of the family. 
In the EU Treaty of Lisbon, however, the opposite seems to be the case: there 
seems to be little that does not fall under the jurisdiction of Brussels. The Treaty 
describes tasks that the EU has to do under all circumstances (e. g., customs, com-
petition and monetary policy, fishing, trade and the internal market policy), tasks 
33 Dam, K. W. The American Fiscal Constitution. The Uni-versity of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 
44, Nb. 2, (1977).
34 Buchanan, J. M. Choice, Contract, and Constitutions. Indiana-polis: Liberty Fund, (2001), 
p. 442.
35 Nef, R. Lob des Non-Zentralismus. Sankt Augustin: Aca-demia Verlag, (2002).
36 Markman, S. Constitutional Myths and Realities. Imprimis, Vol. 34, Number 8, (August, 
2005).
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that can be appropriated if necessary (e. g., environmental policy and consumer 
protection) and tasks the EU supports (e. g., tourism)37.
Power, however, wants more power, all to the good or to the bad. Hence, every 
possibility, how artificially, the EU will use to enlarge it. The manner of subsidiz-
ing activities, for instance., enormously enhances the influence of the EU. Sup-
pose the EU gives a subsidy of 50 % to a certain activity. That is almost blackmail; 
no local government, in their good mind, is opposed to it. For the local authorities 
the gains of the activity has to be only halve of the total costs38. The pressure to 
accept the subsidy is enormous. Even, however, if the given task for the (fed-
eral) central authorities is small, as, e. g., described in the U.S constitution, for 
insterstate trade. Just as the EU-authorities do have a stake in border crossing 
interests. That, however, is a license for government involvement, at least in the 
US, in approximately everything. Look at what did happen in the US. The federal 
authorities may not meddle with agriculture in the separate states. Yet – with the 
rule and power of the authority over interstate trade in hand – it states how many 
acres in the separate states have to remain wasted. How can the federal authorities 
motivate this? A farmer did grow grain on his “wasted” land and fed the grain to 
his cattle. At first site, no interstate trade seems to take place. The Supreme Court, 
however, did argue that if the farmer had not grown grain on his wasted land, he 
would have bought it. He, also, influenced the price of grain on the market and so 
interstate trade39.
In general, federalism in the US is (1) the division of powers of government 
between the national government and the states. (2) the separation of powers in 
which each branch of the national government---the legislative, the executive, and 
the judicial branch---has distinct responsibilities, yet is subject to the checks and 
balances of the other branches. In addition, (3) there is the principle of limited 
government in which the national government is constrained to exercise only 
those powers set forth by the constitution40.
In sum, even if there is a clear separation of powers and limitation of tasks, as 
in the US, central government often grabs the possibility to enlarge its powers. 
What then can we expect of the description of tasks in the (revised) EU treaty? 
There seems to be little that does not fall directly or indirectly under the jurisdic-
tion of Brussels. The EU has tasks to do under all circumstances (e. g., customs, 
competition and monetary policy, fishing, and internal market policy), tasks that 
37 See: Treaty (2005, 2007).
38 Edwards, C. Downsizing the Federal Government. Washing-ton: Cato Institute, (2005).
39 Snyder, J. R. Unrestrained Appetites, Unlimited Government. The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty, 
(May 1998).
40 Markman, S. Constitutional Myths and Realities. Imprimis, Vol. 34, Number 8, (August, 
2005), p. 2.
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can be appropriated if necessary (e. g., environmental policy and consumer pro-
tection) and tasks it supports (e. g., tourism)41. The just-stated possibility of sub-
sidizing activities enormously enlarges the influence of the EU. See how acute 
the gold rush response is with “matching” grants. In general, also EU-tasks, in 
principle, are many and hard to control by a democratic decision-making process. 
A process in which everyone thinks that other people do pay for a certain policy 
and changing majorities have to be bought, time and again. An ever-increasing 
government budget might be expected.
4.2 The Institutional Structure Of Fiscal Decision-Making
For Hayek it is necessary to create a Legislative Assembly (upper house) that 
states the rules and a Governmental Assembly (ordinary legislature or parlia-
ment) that administrates within those rules42. A new and differently elected and 
organized Legislative Assembly should draw up semi-permanent fiscal rules, and 
should not be subject to influences of particular groups. In the EU, however, there 
is an intentional combination, the decision-making (institutional) triangle, of the 
European Commission, the European Council and European Parliament. All of 
whom state what the budget is and make the policy within it43. Consequently, the 
proposed change in policy of the EU from unanimity to majority rule is no effec-
tive constraint on the exercise and growth of EU power44.
Constitutional economics is both thinking outside the box and back to basics. 
For the EU it is scientifically largely uncharted territory. Hayek’s model of bicam-
eralism for fiscal powers for example, to my knowledge, has never been part of 
any political agenda. It is thinking outside the box of mainstream public finance45. 
41 See Treaty (2004, ep. 2007).
42 Hayek, F. A. Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, (1982), Volume 3.
43 See Treaty (2004, 2007).
 Scharpf, F. W. The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
44, No, 4, (2006) pp. 845-64.
 Thomson, R., Hosli, M. Who Has Power in the EU? The Commission Council and Parliament 
in Legislative Decision-making. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2, (2006).
44 Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. M. The Power to Tax, Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitu-
tion. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, (1980), (2000).
 Baldwin, R., Widgrén, M. Council voting in the Constitutional Treaty: Devil in the details. 
CEPS Policy Brief, No. 53, (July 2004).
45 Blankart, C. B. Öffentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie, München: Franz Vahlen, (1991).
 Rosen, H. S., Windisch, R., Oberdieck, E. Finanzwissenschaft I, München: Oldenbourg 
Verlag, (1992).
 Enderlein, H., eo. The EU Budget. How Much Scope for Institutional Reform? European Cen-
tral Bank, Occasional Paper Series, no. 27, (April 2005).
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In due course, the separate “taxation chamber” can even grow into an institution 
where all legislation in the EU is made independently from the direct policy use 
of it. For Buchanan the European constitution is an opportunity, EU citizens need 
to grasp, for going back to constitutional basics46. The constitutionalist mindset, 
however, that says that persons owe loyalty to the constitution rather than to the 
government, is (has become) foreign to European thinking47. The idea that there 
are, or should be, any limits on the powers of the government has largely passed 
from the contemporary scene. This lack of a constitutional mindset is also part of 
the problem this research program has to tackle.
Of central importance is that constitutionalism can be the core of fiscal con-
straints in which subsidiarity (the primary liability for the solution of problems 
lies with the smallest functional unit) and the consent of free individuals (trust), 
two of the main problems of the EU, are of central importance.
5. Conclusion
In general, the EU-budget hovers between one that redistributes money between 
members and one that achieves certain EU-wide policies. The budget is the cause 
of many of the bitterest arguments between the Member States. Often, the objec-
tive of spending seems to be to achieve acceptable net balances rather than agreed 
policy. It has been said that the EU budget has never been used as a means to meet 
the objectives of the Union but rather as a negotiating tool for its members48.
If fiscal dissatisfaction in the EU is the result of a growing tendency in which 
majorities do decide, and hence does give changing majority coalitions political 
authority, within that framework we can never solve the problem. There is another 
possibility. Form the point of view of constitutional economics and fiscal sociol-
ogy two things are necessary. One, we need a fiscal constitution on the bases of a 
clearly enumerated list of tasks for the EU. Second, we have to split fiscal powers: 
the establishment of a separate legislative branch of the EU that does state the 
principles of taxation and another branch that makes policy inside those rules. 
Presently, however, often majority by means of the European Commission and 
46 Buchanan, J. M. An American Perspective on Europe’s Con-stitutional Opportunity. Cato 
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, (Winter 1991), pp. 619-629.
 Buchanan, J. M. Europe as Social Reality. Constitutional Political Economy, 7, (1996a), 
pp. 253, 256.
47 See Buchanan, 1996b, 2003, cf. Weiler, 1996; Shaw, 2000; Bermann, 2004; Bellamy, 2006.
48 Figueira, F. How to Reform the EU Budget? Going Beyond Fiscal Federalism. Utrecht, (2006).
 Eppink, D-J Europese Mandarijnen, Achter de schermen van de Europese Commissie. Tielt: 
Lannoo, (2007), p. 190.
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the European Parliament does set the fiscal rules as well as does make policy 
inside those rules on a seemingly endless list of possible tasks.
In the wake of the demise of the proposed Constitution, instead of the pres-
ent non-constitutional approach, a model fiscal constitution for the EU budget 
can become an agenda-setting focal point for a new scientific research program 
(constitutional economics and fiscal sociology) and future EU policy. A fiscal 
constitution is a means proportionate to the problem at hand. A fiscal constitution 
(1) can be a real possibility. In history, constitutional debate has always been pos-
sible and fruitfu. (2) it creates trust between the states. A shared framework facili-
tates a robust democratic debate. (3) it makes subsidiarity a real possibility. The 
market economy functions within a limited government. And (4) it substitutes for 
improving the morals between Member States. Just as the market economy does 
the same by steering self-interested human behavior within a constitutional order 
of private property.
In sum, this paper shows how we can use the reformed new EU-budget by 
imposing constraining rules to promote solidarity and trust in the setting of an 
EU-Leviathan. Instead of emphasizing efficiency, to up-date goals and means, 
and / or to aim at greater fairness the paper shifts the emphasis to the making of 
authentic rules: the design of possible constraints on a revenue-maximizing EU. 
Because of their voluntary consent (an internal criterion based on the desires of 
the Member States themselves) it is acceptable to the Member States that are to 
be subject to it. No external criteria, and hence no agreement over the goodness 
or badness of these criteria used, e. g., allocative efficiency or equal treatment for 
equals, are necessary. The shared framework of a model EU-budget (politically 
independent fiscal rules) creates trust and social cohesion between the Member 
States, the European Parliament, Commission, and Council of Ministers. It facil-
itates a robust democratic debate within a consistent, transparent and reliable 
policy and legislation framework. Member States can anticipate making appro-
priate behavior adjustments, including those made over a long–term planning 
period. The paper gives the analytical arguments in support of two appropriately 
designed budgetary measures (moderately permanent features) re the up-coming 
EU Budget Review: a clear limitation of tasks and a split in budgetary powers.
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